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less. Regarding privacy behaviours in groups of lifeloggers, we found that people were more willing to share images of people
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1 INTRODUCTION
Automatic visual lifelogging was once the domain of ubiquitous computing pioneers, such as Steve Mann
[28] or the original Microsoft SenseCam developers [17]. Today consumer level devices such as the GoPro
(https://gopro.com/) for recording individual sports and recreation, the Narrative Clip (NC2, unavailable due to
restructure at time of writing) [31] and Snapchat Spectacles [39], make visual lifelogging possible for anyone.
Automatic wearable cameras aside, the fact that most people carry a manually operated camera at all times in the
form of their smartphone has made the constant sharing of images an everyday activity. Any image taken in
a public place carries a privacy risk, but it is the images taken automatically by lifelogging cameras that carry
the greatest risk, as they are not under direct user control. We were inspired by the work of Hoyle at al. [20]
who explored the individual privacy behaviours of visual lifeloggers among undergraduates in a US university
campus setting. With the growing ubiquity of individuals with non-wearable cameras constantly taking and
posting images on social media, we were also interested in how privacy behaviours would change when groups
of people were all wearing cameras. In the next sub-section we discuss the relevant privacy theory and research
questions we sought to address.
1.1 The Privacy Behaviours of Multiple Visual Lifeloggers
Visual lifelogging, in particular the sharing of the captured images, needs to be carefully managed by users in
order to protect their own and other people’s privacy [18]. The main dierences between conventional and
lifelogging cameras is that lifelogging cameras capture a larger volume of images, and that image capture is
passive and automatic, i.e. the timing and composition of each image capture is not chosen by the camera wearer
[22]. Although bystanders that the wearer is interacting with may be aware that they are being photographed
(if the lifelogger informs them about the camera) they do not know the precise moment that they are being
captured. This means that while general consent might be given by a bystander to be photographed, the wearer
still has to make post-hoc judgments about the bystander’s privacy when reviewing the images. There will also
be bystanders who are unaware of the camera, and have thus not given explicit consent.
These types of privacy management practices have interpersonal elements, because they require communication
with bystanders or, where communication is not possible, for the wearer to infer the bystanders’ preferences.
These inferences could be based on the individual’s own preferences, or based on social norms [3]. Moreover,
bystanders may fear sanction if they resist privacy invasions and this can result in lack of obvious resistance
on their part [29], meaning that lifeloggers may be required to interpret others’ secret preferences. People may
thus feel an obligation to protect the privacy of others even when others do not ask them to (see [5, 35]). We
have anecdotal reports in our early work that bystanders were reluctant to ask lifeloggers about their cameras, in
particular they often assumed it was a medical device.
Not all decisions to turn o the camera or delete photographs will be based on privacy, however. Impression
management behaviour [14] - how lifeloggers manage the attention that wearing a camera brings, and how they
respond to people’s looks or comments (e.g., Google Glass was criticized for its appearance, as well as the privacy
concerns it raised [12]) - might inter-relate with privacy behaviours, or be mistaken for privacy behaviours
because they manifest in the same way. For example, choosing not to wear a camera in a particular setting could
be due to feeling inappropriately attired and not wanting to draw attention to oneself, rather than the belief that
the bystanders in that setting do not wish to be photographed for privacy reasons. To try and provoke behaviour
and conversation around this issue, we added an occasionally ashing LED to our camera to explore whether
the LED enabled bystanders further opportunity to enquire about the camera, and how this feature made the
lifeloggers become more aware of both their privacy and their appearance.
In the Hoyle et al. [20] study we use as a basis for our study, they gave 36 undergraduates a lifelogging camera
(composed of an Android phone running custom software) to wear around their neck. They provided features to
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pause recording, delete recent images, as well as to review images afterwards and delete them or indicate which
they would be comfortable sharing within a certain category of people. The frequency of these decisions was used
as a proxy for privacy behaviour. In addition to the considerations examined by Hoyle et al, it seems apparent
that studies of visual lifelogging should consider more than just the individual lifelogger. We suggest that the
popularity of visual lifelogging is likely to increase; therefore we are interested in how lifeloggers interact with
each other and treat each other’s privacy. Previous privacy theory and empirical research has found that privacy
regulation can be shared amongst members of a group [2, 35] - but this has never been studied in the context of
visual lifelogging, as far as we know. New research questions arise in the context of co-lifelogging and privacy.
For instance - is there a dierence in privacy behaviours when interacting with or capturing other lifeloggers,
compared to bystanders? Does being a lifelogger imply consent, such that lifeloggers feel less need to protect
other lifeloggers’ privacy? These questions inspired us to ask groups of people to wear lifelogging cameras.
We were also interested in expanding Hoyle et al.’s analysis of how setting might inuence privacy decisions.
To do this we code images based on location categories - with the expectation that there might be locations
participants treat as more or less private, as well as coding the category of bystanders within the images (i.e.,
whether someone is a lifelogger, non-lifelogger friend, or stranger), whether the lifelogger and bystanders appear
to be interacting with each other, and the type of objects within the images (e.g., alcohol, computer screens). Each
of these is aimed to add context to the images that might explain whether people keep, delete, or share images.
1.2 Building the Cameras and Replicability
Initially our study was intended to be a replication study, but the rst problem we faced was nding appropriate
camera hardware that would allow the major features of Hoyle et al.’s study [20] to be replicated. The Microsoft
Sensecam and its commercial spin o are no longer available and other commercial o-the-shelf (COTS) cameras,
such as the (then available) NC2 wearable camera, were not suitable for this study for 3 reasons. Firstly, to access
the images taken by the camera required a proprietary application to be installed on the participant’s computer.
We felt this would result in a higher level of non-compliance. Secondly, the NC2 had an upper limit on the photo
interval of 120 seconds which would create too many images for participants to review (in [20] the interval was
300 seconds). Finally, the NC2 was relatively expensive when compared to the cost of building a device ourselves
(note: by the time we wrote this paper the company had recently gone bankrupt). Hoyle et al. used a custom
modied Android rmware, which is no longer available, and current Android releases do not allow apps to
access the camera without being explicitly activated by the user. The newest releases of Android require root
access to the device to allow the camera to take images without any user interaction. Rooting a device that could
contain images of a personal nature exposed participants to an undue security risk that we felt would be an
unethical research practice.
Upon nding we could not easily replicate the previous study and in light of recent concerns in the psychology
literature about an inability to replicate many results from publications in top journals [34], we sought to
understand the state of replicability in pervasive and ubiquitous computing in order to make our study replicable.
Many experiments use proprietary and undocumented hardware, such as Vasilescu et al.’s development of
autonomous underwater vehicles [41], or complex environments which are dicult to replicate in the wild,
such as city-scale sensor networks [38]. Wilson et al. argues that replication yields rewards, such as improving
the reputation of the community, improving condence in ndings, and enhancing teaching [45]. Increased
awareness of the value of replicability is ltering through to the HCI literature, with more researchers sharing
their data, methods, and scripts for analyses [30]. In this paper, we adapt and extend a study which was not
inherently replicable into one which is itself replicable, with source code, methodological details and hardware
designs made openly available. We chose a long established widely used open hardware platform for our camera
system [25]. Although this will eventually become deprecated, our open design will allow researchers to update
the system with changes in the technology landscape.
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1.3 Research estions
Our initial research questions mirror those of [20]:
RQ1: How do lifeloggers manage collection of images and in particular the deletion of unwanted images, or
prevent the logging of images?
RQ2: What characteristics of the images and the environment make the lifelogger more or less likely to share
an image?
RQ3: How do lifeloggers report the reactions of bystanders?
To adapt these questions to specically address our study, on how behaviour changed when an entire social
group wore lifelogging cameras as opposed to individuals, our extended research questions are as follows.
In terms of how the lifelogger behaves:
RQ2.1: Does the presence of other lifeloggers in images make the lifelogger more or less likely to share images?
RQ2.2: If a person captured in an image is unknown to the lifelogger, does this make the lifelogger more or less
likely to share the image?
In terms of how bystanders behave:
RQ3.1: How do bystanders react to more obvious indicators of the camera (e.g. ashing LEDs and signs)?
RQ3.2: Do bystanders who are known to the lifelogger react dierently from strangers?
And in terms of being around other lifeloggers:
RQ4: How do people report behaving and feeling about wearing a lifelogging camera when they are around
other lifeloggers, compared to non-lifeloggers?
Answers to these questions will provide insights into the privacy issues in a near future when more people will
be wearing lifelogging cameras. Moreover, we explain our study in sucient detail and make camera hardware
design, source code, questionnaires and interview questions publicly available to enable replication of this
research study.
2 RELATED WORK
The RepliCHI movement has identied challenges to replicability which resonate with the ubicomp community.
Lallemand et al. nd that as concepts and terminology in HCI are fast-changing, it can be dicult to meaningfully
replicate a study after a long period of time, where the same concept may invite two wildly dierent interpretations
over time [26]. For example, between the time of Hoyle et al.’s study and ours, fast-changing cultural norms
about self-photography such as the emerging “sele era” [40], could manifest in signicantly dierent results.
Similarly, Patil notes that replicating privacy studies is dicult as people’s privacy attitudes and competencies
evolve along with technology, making it dicult to attribute a cause to dierences in results [44]. In our study,
we had to design hardware to approximate the conditions of Hoyle et al.’s study, however Carlson et al. note
that trying to maintain consistent parameters in hardware replications can be dicult, particularly where the
dierences are dicult to quantify [8].
Privacy is a notoriously dicult concept to dene, and has been operationalized in several ways in the literature.
While Westin argues that privacy is a form of control over information [43], Gavison denes privacy as limited
access to the self, in terms of the extent to which one is known, physically accessible, or the subject of attention
[13]. Nissenbaum’s contextual integrity [32] posits that privacy is maintained by context-specic norms, which
consider when it is appropriate for information to be transmitted, and to whom, rather than information itself
being inherently public or private. These contrasting perspectives have implications for how we frame the privacy
concerns of bystanders. For example, considering privacy in terms of control mechanisms does not account for
the experiences of bystanders who are unable to extend any control over how their information is used, nor
adopt defensive behaviours when they are unaware they are being surveilled. Conversely, by considering the
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privacy expectations of bystanders in public situations, contextual integrity can provide a means of diagnosing
the appropriateness of such technologies.
Gurrin et al. [15] note a number of novel privacy challenges in visual lifelogging, including:
(1) the increasing resolution of captured images and inclusion of other metadata such as locations,
(2) the lack of curation meaning potentially sensitive contexts are captured making the systematic redaction
of individuals or locations dicult,
(3) the lack of consent from bystanders,
(4) the permanence of captured images,
(5) the ability to construct false narratives from a subset of collected data which could have legal implications,
and
(6) the security of the captured data.
Hoyle et al. [20] provide a concise summary of the literature on visual lifelogging and some of the related
privacy issues, however most of this work assumes that individual lifeloggers are the only ones with cameras.
More recently, Clinch et al. [11] reported a study involving an instrumented house with xed cameras where 13
participants also had wearable cameras. They intentionally chose a remote location to exclude the possibility of
accidentally capturing bystanders. Despite the closed environment with multiple lifeloggers, over time periods
less than 10 minutes they had a relatively low percentage of reciprocal images, that is, one lifelogger capturing
another whose camera captured the rst. They also found that lifeloggers frequently forgot to switch o their
camera when entering private places and those that did often forgot to switch back on when exiting. A major
concern for their participants, however, was the capture of possibly condential information on open laptop
screens and phones. This was also noted in Hoyle et al.’s more recent analysis [19] and Korayem et al. [24]
propose a framework to automatically address this issue. While Chowdhury et al. [10] nd that lifeloggers exhibit
little concern for the privacy of bystanders, other work [9] from the perspective of bystanders nds many are
unwilling to have their images used without consent, with privacy preferences depending on the context and
content of the photos. The authors argue lifelogging applications must understand context in order to make
appropriate privacy decisions.
One aspect of constant still and video recording is that it becomes normalized and no longer noticed. Portno
et al. [36] saw this eect with webcam indicator lights on laptops. One of Koelle et al.’s [23] recommendations
was that devices that can record images should have some kind of indicator to show when this is happening, yet
current small COTS lifelogging cameras (e.g. [31] [39]) are designed to be unobtrusive and not draw attention,
hence they are not suitable for our interest in looking at the eect of drawing attention to the camera.
3 METHODOLOGY
In this section, we give details of our camera design as well as provide information about the source code for
the software running the camera and the image reviewing software used by participants. We also describe the
protocol for participants and the post-study image coding method we used. All these materials, including yers
for participant recruitment, consent forms, instructions for participants, questionnaires given to participants
and image coding protocol together with image coding analyses results are available in our public repository at
https://github.com/vllstudy16/vllstudy16.
3.1 Camera Design
We built a wearable and programmable camera with various o the shelf components packed together in a 3D
printed red plastic box of size 65x65x22 mm (see Fig. 1, components and build instructions are explained in
CameraBuild-Report.pdf in the repository). The wearable camera runs on a 2000 mAh rechargeable LiPo battery.
It can eectively work for an entire day and then needs to be charged overnight through the micro USB slot
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Fig. 1. Lifelogging camera given to participants.
provided. Our design diered from [20] in that we did not include GPS logging (because of power requirements)
but we did include an LED to draw attention to the camera. In order to keep the camera design simple we did not
include a pause button, instead relying on people to switch o or hide the camera as the button added complexity
and we had no easy way to indicate that the camera was recording again.
A user can wear the camera around their neck and move around. The LED ashes once when the wearable
camera is switched on (it remains on if there is an error, like a missing SD card). It takes automatic pictures
of 640 × 480 pixel resolution and stores them in the micro SD card. The software running on the Arduino
microcontroller creates dierent directories for each day, each storing pictures taken on that particular day.
Images are stored with the naming convention: < hour_minutes_seconds > and are taken 5 minutes apart. Some
more features of the life-logging camera are:
(1) Push button on top: deletes any images taken in the last 5 minutes and logs a timestamp in a text le.
(2) “Random LED ash” mode: Activated by switching on camera with button pressed. The LED then blinks
with 2 consecutive ashes with 0.5 second duration with a gap of at least 15 minutes (so that it is not
predictable to bystanders and thus they will be more likely to notice it). The start and end ash time is
logged in a text le, also stored on the SD card.
3.2 Image Reviewing Soware
The image reviewing application was developed using Java 8, which required participants to have this Java version
installed on their personal computers. Java was chosen as it is cross-platform (could be used on GNU/Linux, OS
X and Windows XP through to Windows 8) and development had a low barrier to entry. Java 8 was chosen over
Java 7 since it has better support for Java FX, which made developing a GUI that could be correctly displayed on
any resolution screen much easier. The participants were asked to remove the micro-SD card from the camera
each evening and insert it into their laptop using the micro-SD to USB converter device provided. They were
then instructed to launch the image reviewing application (see subsection 3.7 - Daily Image Review).
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3.3 Pilot Testing
The cameras and image reviewing software were piloted on two Psychology PhD candidates, which allowed
us to improve the instructions and questionnaires. Participants also requested adjustable neck straps to t the
camera over their heads and allow the camera to sit in a comfortable position.
3.4 Recruitment and Enrollment
Groups of undergraduate students on a large university campus (University of Exeter, UK) were recruited through
an online paid participant pool run by the Psychology department. Participants were all at least 18 years old,
and all were in pre-existing friendship groups or shared accommodation. Participants were given information
and consent forms to read and sign. They were told that none of their raw data would be published, and that
they were free to withdraw at any time. Participants answered a questionnaire, and received their cameras and
instructions for use. They were asked to wear the camera from that point onwards, unless they were in a context
where it was uncomfortable to do so, or it was not permitted. Participants returned to the lab approximately 5
days later (e.g., Monday-Friday), where they answered a nal questionnaire and participated in an interview.
The camera given to each participant (see Fig. 1) had a label on it saying “University of Exeter - Photography in
progress”, with the “LED ash” mode activated.
3.5 Ethical Considerations
The study was approved by University of Exeter’s IEB, who had particular concerns about people sharing images
on social media without express permission. Following [20], and the concerns of our IEB we developed the
following list of “Do’s and Don’ts” to give participants:
• Respect rules about taking images in public places (e.g., if you see a “no photography allowed” sign).
• Respect other people’s wishes to not be photographed. If anyone objects to you wearing the camera in
their presence, then put it in your pocket. If anyone asks that a photo of them be deleted simply press the
delete button. When you review the images if you see an image of someone who requested that you not
photograph them please delete it at that time.
• Please delete images with any nudity. It is specically prohibited to keep (or share) images of naked
people or images that would otherwise compromise an individual’s safety or reputation.
• If you observe other members participating in this study using the technology inappropriately or illegally,
please get in contact with the researcher.
As with [20] we emphasized to participants that they must respect the privacy of bystanders and gave them
“business cards” that contained the researchers contact details, so they could hand them to bystanders to request
further information. No bystanders made contact with the researchers.
3.6 Daily Image Review
The participants were asked to review their images at the end of each day using the software we supplied, which
automatically logged their answers to a JSON le. The step-by-step procedure for reviewing images was:
• Participants were instructed to delete images that should be immediately deleted (e.g., containing nudity,
locations where photography was prohibited, or of people who had asked not to be photographed);
• They were asked to tick reasons for deleting images;
• They were asked to mark images that were blurry or contained no usable information;
• The software presented them with all of the times that day that they used the delete button, including an
image prior to deletion (to prompt their memory), and asked why they used the delete button at that
time;
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• Next, participants were shown all images they had not deleted, and, following [20], were asked if they
would not be comfortable sharing them with 3 classes of groups - “Close friends and family,” “Other friends
and family,” “Co-workers, classmates, and acquaintances,”, or if they would share it with “Everyone”; and
• Finally, participants answered questions about why they would or would not share these images; for
images they said they would not share they were asked how embarrassed or angry they would be if the
images were shared.
3.7 estionnaires and Interview
Participants completed questionnaires at the beginning and end of the study. The questionnaires were adapted
from [20], and we added further measures of privacy attitudes [5][43][42] and added questions for how long they
have known each other, and how they know each other. The end of study questionnaire repeated the privacy
measures and included questions about how they felt while wearing the camera. The interview questions were
designed in line with our research questions - including how they felt wearing the camera, the specic behaviours
they engaged in to manage the camera, and the reported reactions of bystanders. The full content of these
materials are available on our public repository at https://github.com/vllstudy16/vllstudy16.
3.8 Compensation
Participants were given GBP 7 per day up to 5 days (Max: GBP 35 ≈ USD 50), depending on the number of days
they completed. Participants were also put into a prize draw for an iPad mini.
3.9 Image Content Analysis
Following Hoyle et al. [20] we developed an initial coding scheme and four people from the research team coded
ten random images. This team met to discuss the coding and make some adjustments to clarify unspecied criteria
that emerged during the initial coding. The nal coding scheme was then carried out on all of the remaining
images. One person coded each photograph, and then approximately 30% of all images were randomly selected
and coded by a second coder. Inter-rater reliability was calculated on all categorical elds, using Krippendorf’s
alpha[16], and all codes included in the analysis reached substantial or excellent agreement (from α = .75 − .85).
The coding instructions and nal results from our coders may also be found in the repository.
4 FINDINGS
The ndings are organized as follows: we rst report on the participant demographics and general privacy
attitudes (4.1), and then we outline participant in-situ collection and deletion practices (4.2). The next subsection
(4.3) is an analysis of sharing decisions made in the daily image review, based on the presence of subjects, objects,
and locations in the images, followed by a subsection (4.4) on the participants reections in the interviews on
their camera use, deletion and sharing practices, and nally a subsection on the eects of the design features of
the cameras (4.5). Although we do conduct multiple tests, we have maintained the alpha to determine signicance
at .05 because we argue that nding an eect where one does exist (i.e. avoiding Type II error) is more important
at this stage, than reducing false positives (i.e. Type I error) [4], and point to the sharing percentages as containing
more meaningful information about the importance of each nding. We also note that all ndings require future
replication.
4.1 Participants
Seven groups of between 2-6 participants (26 in total) were run over 5 day periods from January to March, 2016.
One participant withdrew from the study after the camera did not work the rst day. There were 16 women and
10 men. The majority identied themselves as British (19) and were in their rst year of university (24). Nearly
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Table 1. Total images captured, kept, shared
Number
Total images captured 5,628
Total deleted images 1,656 (29%)
Range and average kept per participant 15-308, 103.6
Corrupt or unusable images 1,390 (25%)
Uses of delete button (by number of participants) 77 (14)
Most uses of delete button by one participant 21
Total kept images shared with everyone 2,031 (79%)
Total images not comfortable sharing with close family/friends and/or
other family/friends and/or acquaintances
452 (17%)
Total images not comfortable sharing with anyone 49 (.019%)
Images unaccounted for 50 (.02%)
half were studying Psychology (11), and within each group they were all house/atmates or enrolled in the same
degree program (having known each other for an average of 8.3 months).
All reported regular use of Facebook, the majority (19) reported use of Instagram, and Snapchat (16), and half use
Twitter (13). Most said they were comfortable being tagged in images online (M = 6.23, 9-pt scale), with a reported
monthly average frequency of sharing images online (M = 5, SD = 1.96, 9-pt scale). We used an adapted Westin
privacy measure [7] taken before participants started using the cameras (α = .68,M = 5.2, SD = .99, on a 9-pt
scale where a higher score reects higher privacy concern). These privacy attitudes were not correlated with any
sharing or deleting behaviour [33]. We categorized the distribution of the sample into Privacy Fundamentalists,
Privacy Pragmatists, and Privacy Unconcerned categories [21], however most participants were Pragmatists and
too few participants were in the Fundamentalist and Unconcerned categories to make any comparison.
We also measured other-contingent privacy [5] (i.e. assessing whether people believe their privacy depends
on the behaviour of others) with 4-items on a 9-pt scale (M = 4.77, SD = 1.59,α = .85); and 5-items measuring
respect for others privacy (Median = 7.6, SD = 1.2,α = .90) [5]. Respect for others’ privacy had a ceiling eect,
and was not correlated to any sharing or deleting behaviour, however those scoring high on other-contingent
privacy were less likely to want to share images with anyone (r = −.550,p = .012) (taking into account the total
number of images captured per participant).
4.2 In-situ Image Collection and Deletion Practices
Participants said that they tended to do most of their deletion through the end of day review rather than using
the in-situ delete button. However, some reported turning the camera o when they were doing the same activity
for an extended period, to avoid having to delete images later (although one said it was because they were
embarrassed that they didn’t do much that day). Table 1 presents the overall numbers of images kept, deleted, and
shared. Details of particular note are that that the participant who used the delete button 21 times stated it was
for ‘no reason’ or ‘other reason’, and that the images unaccounted for would have been caused by participants
deleting them directly from the SD rather than through the app. Corrupt or unusable images refer to images that
participants marked as blurry, dark, or corrupt.
Although 14 participants used the delete button, some mentioned accidentally pressing it. Only 4 people said
that they purposely used it, which was a much lower rate than found by [20]. Most said there was never an
occasion that they realized that did not want captured (except one participant when she had just taken cash
out) and that they preferred to delete the images at the end of the day, through the software. In contrast with
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Table 2. Images shared by location and content
Feature Number
shared
%
shared
Feature Number
shared
%
shared
Signicant
Dierence?
Indoors 2191 80.3 Outdoors 267 83.5 No
Other people present 1076 78.7 No other people
present
1399 81.9 Yes
Other lifeloggers
present
89 80.2 Other people present 847 78.7 No
Computer monitor vis-
ible
387 80.4 Computer monitor not
visible
282 80.9 No
Alcohol and vices
present
116 62.1 No alcohol or vices
present
2359 81.4 Yes
other studies [11], only one of them reported forgetting to take the camera o for the bathroom or other private
spaces. These management techniques are consistent with the ndings of [20] on RQ1 although our design did
not include a pause button so we could not measure how often they switched o or hid the camera other than as
reported in interviews.
4.3 Daily Review Sharing Decisions: Image Subjects, Objects and Location
This section draws on data from the image reviewing software and the image coding. As seen in Table 2, fewer
images were shared when other people are in them, than pictures with no people in them (χ 2 = 4.0,d f = 1,p =
0.046). This suggests that the presence of other people makes lifeloggers less likely to share images, and is in
general consistent with Hoyle et al. [20]. However privacy decisions are likely made based on the lifeloggers’
relationship with the bystander or the social context, so to investigate this at a ner level we categorized the
human subjects (collectively referred to as ‘bystanders’) in the captured images into strangers, group members,
and non-participant friends, as well as categorising locations. In the following sub-sections we look at how these
data address our research questions.
4.3.1 Presence of Bystanders in Images. RQ2.1 asked whether participants treat images of other lifeloggers
any dierently to images of other people, and our results indicate that they do not. Slightly more images were
shared when another participant is in them, to when other non-participants are present, but this dierence was
not signicant (χ 2 = 0.13,d f = 1,p = 0.72).
In order to address RQ2.2, we compared sharing results for images with people who were interacting with
the participant with sharing results for images where people were not interacting with the participant (coded
based on their proximity and orientation to the camera, “known” versus “unknown”). Our results show that
lifeloggers are less likely to share images of “unknown” people compared to images of “known” people (72.5% vs.
81.7%,χ 2 = 11.5,d f = 1,p < 0.001), To account for whether these decisions are inuenced by whether people are
recognizable in the images, we also found that even when faces are visible (i.e. not obscured or hidden from the
camera), lifeloggers are less likely to share images of “unknown” people than images of “known” people (68.4%
vs. 79.5%, χ 2 = 5.1,d f = 1,p = 0.024) .
4.3.2 Location. Participants wore the cameras in a range of locations including lecture halls, the gym, shops,
pubs, trains, and church. The places participants reported turning o or removing cameras were the bank, public
toilets, and in workplaces that are restricted to the public or customer facing.
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The location appeared to have a small eect on sharing behaviour with outdoor locations slightly more likely
to be shared than indoor (see Table 2, χ 2 = 1.6,d f = 1,p = 0.212), although this was not signicant. We did a
more ne-grained analysis by categorizing locations as “bathroom”, “bedroom”, “dorm room”, “living area/at
or kitchen”, “indoor public” and “outdoor public”. According to our ndings, people were less likely to share
images taken in “bathroom” compared to the rest of the locations (35% vs 80.5% on average for the rest of the
location categories, χ 2 = 1.6,d f = 1,p < 0.001). This suggests that, in answer to RQ2, for our participants among
locations only “bathroom” reduced sharing behaviour.
4.3.3 Presence of Screens and Vices (alcohol/tobacco). While [20] found a signicant dierence in sharing when
a screen was present, we found no signicant eect with near identical sharing percentages (χ 2 = 0.001,d f =
1,p = 0.975). Separating images based on screens with visible content as opposed to others (screen closed or
blurred content or no screen) revealed a similar result (80.4% vs. 80.5%, χ 2 = 0.008,d f = 1,p = 0.929). From the
image reviewing software we can see that only 15 images had screens visible where they chose not to share even
with close friends. The ticked reasons for not sharing these images included 4 information privacy reasons, and
10 other-privacy related reasons (It would be embarrassing to share it, It would have violated someone else’s
privacy, Objects (other than people) in the photo, Participant was in the photo, People within the photo) and
12 non-privacy related reasons (e.g. uninteresting content). In the interviews one participant shed light on this
question, saying that it was just “normal stu or Netix or my Facebook, that doesn’t really matter”. Thus, from
what we can observe, participants in this study appeared mostly unconcerned about sharing visible screens.
The qualitative results from [19] suggest that lifeloggers choose not to share images with vices such as alcohol
or cigarettes and our quantitative ndings support this. Images containing alcohol are less likely to be shared
than those without (see Table 2, χ 2 = 26.4,d f = 1,p < 0.001) and sharing behaviour does not change even when
faces are visible (62.3% vs. 80.0%, χ 2 = 7.9,d f = 1,p < 0.001) or when the person is known to the lifelogger
(60% vs. 78.6%, χ 2 = 13.3,d f = 1,p = 0.005). This addresses RQ2 in that vices decrease likelihood of sharing and
indicate a stronger privacy threat regardless of whether or not the subject in the image is a stranger.
4.4 Interviews: Interactions with Bystanders and Reflections on Sharing Decisions
This section draws on the interview data to address RQ3 - on the behaviour of bystanders, and RQ4 - how
lifeloggers behave around other lifeloggers and non-lifeloggers. This section has been organized around the
themes that emerged from the interview transcripts.
4.4.1 Lifelogging at Home with and without Other Lifeloggers. The home is typically understood as the ultimate
example of a private domain, however for those who shared a house with other lifeloggers, their reported level of
privacy concern while wearing the cameras at home varied depending on whether there were also non-lifeloggers
living in the same residence. Two of the groups who lived together said it was very easy being around each other
at home, and that they just did their usual activities, such as watching TV together (“At home it’s okay for us
because we know the place, so it was very familiar.”).
Living at home with other non-lifeloggers was usually more problematic. All groups reported asking for express
permission from their non-participating at/housemates, with the exception of one group who said they did not
think to ask their other atmate (this person was apparently “surprised but found it funny”). One participant
who had non-lifelogger atmates reported feeling ne using the camera in her bedroom, but when she went into
the kitchen she felt she was being intrusive (“it’s our little safe space and I wander around in my pajamas with
my hair up and not okay to face the world and so do they. I felt like at times I could really be encroaching on
that with having a camera.”), although she also said her atmates did not appear concerned. However, another
participant heard through another atmate that one person in her house “felt weird about it [the camera]”, but
never said anything to her directly. This statement provides evidence that sometimes bystanders may not feel
able to deny access despite feeling discomfort.
Proceedings of the ACM on Interactive, Mobile, Wearable and Ubiquitous Technologies, Vol. 1, No. 2, Article 22. Publication date: June 2017.
22:12 • B. A. Price et al.
Despite this, no one reported diculty in respecting their housemates’ wishes. One participant who was asked
by a atmate not to take images reported becoming very quickly used to turning the camera on and o every
time they were in the same room (“I wasn’t aware that I was wearing it until I saw someone that didn’t want to
be photographed because then I was like, ‘Oh yes, I had that conversation with them,’ and then I’d remember I
was wearing it”). Thus they reported a high degree of ease in transitioning between private and public spaces, or
managing requests for privacy from people that they lived with.
4.4.2 Lifelogging around Non-participant Friends. Four participants said that their housemates, friends, or
boy/girl-friends were initially wary but soon relaxed, e.g.: “Two of the boys at rst were a bit like, ‘Oh, I’m going
to avoid you, I don’t want to be on camera.’ I was like, ‘I can delete any images you don’t want,’ and they were
like, ‘Oh actually it’s quite funny,’ and just ended up posing in front of it instead.”
This initial wariness could emerge for a number of reasons - one reason identied by a participant was that her
friends were initially worried about being captured, but once they learnt that she had control over the images and
could delete them, they then consented to being in the images. This demonstrates that a level of interpersonal
trust in others to protect our privacy can be reassuring and relates to the denition of ‘privacy as control’.
One participant reported not wearing the camera to her rst meeting with her boyfriend’s childhood friend
(“they’re a big part of his life so I didn’t want to be just like this weird girl with a camera”). This concern would
appear to be related to impression management rather than privacy, a point we come back to again later in the
section on Comfort with Lifelogging.
4.4.3 Lifelogging around Strangers. In general, consistent with [20], participants reported few bystanders
having problems with being photographed. In terms of questions from strangers, one participant reported that
when he went to the pub strangers leaned in to read the sign on his camera, but did not say anything. Another
said that the only stranger who asked about the camera was a cashier. Only one participant reported ignoring a
stranger’s question about the camera (they said they kept walking down the street). The higher interest level
(although few objections) from friends compared to the relative lack of interest from strangers suggests that in
answer to RQ3.2 we see a greater eect from known as opposed to unknown bystanders. There are a number of
reasons why this might be the case, which we discuss later in Section 6.
Images containing strangers in the backgrounds were generally reported by participants as not private - for
example, one person said they did not worry because “sometimes, like, for example, in the gym or in the library,
there were 1000 people. It was a lot of faces.”, implying that these faces could not be distinguished. Another
theme around this question was the idea that if people did not know they were being captured then it won’t
aect them (“chances are that would be in the background of a sele anyway”), although one participant did say
that he felt there was some problems with recording people trying to go about their everyday lives, but this was
in reference to the prospect of visual lifelogging become more popular in the future. These ndings suggest that
the reason why fewer photos of “unknown” people were shared than “known” may be because participants were
less interested in sharing them rather than greater concern for strangers’ privacy.
4.4.4 Reflections on Decisions to Keep or Delete Images of Bystanders. Unlike Hoyle et al. [20], only seven
participants reported being asked to delete images (and only by one or two individuals each). The people asking
were non-participant atmates or friends, never strangers. This relative lack of concern from friends and apparent
absence of concern from strangers suggest that in answer to RQ3 bystanders are overall largely unconcerned,
however we elaborate some of the variations to this below.
Despite the apparent lack of concern from others, all participants said that they thought about the privacy
of others. Yet their management of the images diered somewhat from [20]. All participants said they deleted
images of people who requested it, but of those who reported noticing people being uncomfortable but who did
not explicitly ask for their images to be deleted, 3 participants said they did delete the images anyway, while 2
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others said they did not. An example of the reason given for not deleting images was, “because I thought it’s only
going to the researcher, but it wouldn’t be the kind of picture that I’d do much with. I wouldn’t say, ‘Oh, let’s put
this on some massive social media platform and share it with the world.”’ Another person said their deletion of
pictures of others depended on what the other people were doing - “A lot of them, they were either just eating or
sitting down, and so I felt that there was nothing too bizarre about them, or things that they wouldn’t like other
people to see, so I didn’t delete any of them.” This reects the research showing that people make judgments
about others’ privacy preferences[5].
Thus to address RQ1, the understanding that the images would never be shared beyond the researchers
inuenced their decisions (e.g., “because we know that it won’t be published online or anything, or publically, so
it doesn’t matter if there’s embarrassing images because no one will recognize us anyway.”). Others said that the
fairly mundane content of the images meant that they didn’t mind the images being shared.
4.4.5 Reflections on Treatment of Images of Other Lifeloggers vs Non-participant Friends. In the interviews,
participants conveyed their decisions about whether to keep or delete images based on whether they were with
other lifeloggers or non-lifeloggers. We were interested in understanding whether being a lifelogger implies
consent (RQ2.1). There was some variation between the groups in response to this question. One group of
lifeloggers said that they discussed what they would do with each other’s images and agreed they would not post
them on Facebook but they did share images of each other on their (pre-existing) WhatsApp group, “I didn’t
hesitate to put up the funny images of you [speaking to other participant] on to the group chat, whereas ...
whereas I didn’t put the funny one of my atmate up on the at chat.” Therefore, they presumed it was acceptable
to keep images of the other lifeloggers, but not to post them anywhere else without permission.
Another group said that for them the same standards applied to other lifeloggers and non-lifelogger friends
(also reected in the quantitative results on sharing), “So if it was like with a group of friends, like some with
and some without cameras, if I got a really horrendous picture of them I’m like, ‘They’re not going to like that. I
will delete that.’ It was the same principle if I got one of you guys [other lifeloggers] and you weren’t looking
your best, I would just delete it.” These ndings suggest that their pre-existing friendship norms guided their
lifelogging behaviour.
4.5 The Eects of Specific Design Features of the Cameras
4.5.1 Comfort with Lifelogging. Further discussions in the interviews revealed that sometimes participants’
concern about the camera was more about their appearance than privacy (“It was when I walked outside I was
like that’s a bright red thing there that people are going to notice that.”). Thus wearing the camera at home was
sometimes reported to be more comfortable than wearing it in public for this reason, rather than concern about
the privacy of others or themselves. One group also said they felt less conspicuous when the group of them was
wearing the cameras together, despite this drawing more stares from bystanders.
Further interview responses showed a range of feelings about their comfort wearing the camera. A couple of
participants reported discomfort with seeing images of their lives - such as food they were eating, or games they
were playing on their phone. Despite this the same people said that at times they forgot they were wearing a
camera, one even fell asleep with it on. Therefore, it could be that people feel comfortable wearing the camera,
but may not be comfortable with the images captured during that time when reviewing them later; or vice versa.
In the end of study questionnaires participants were asked to rate how comfortable they were (on a scale of
1=not at all, 9=very comfortable). “How comfortable were you around others using a life logging camera?” was
high (Median=7, SD=1.67), as was “how comfortable were you in using the life logging camera during this study
while in private (e.g. at home)?” (Median=8, SD=1.13). “How comfortable were you in using the life logging camera
during this study while in public?” was also above the midpoint, but lower than the other comfort measures and
had greater variability (Median=6, SD=2.17). This supports some of the qualitative ndings explained above.
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As a further indicator of their interest in lifelogging, we asked if they are interested in purchasing a camera in
the future - the mean was low overall (M=3.04, SD=1.9, 9 pt-scale), but had a bi-modal distribution, indicating
some were interested but others were not at all.
4.5.2 Eects of the Camera’s More Obvious Features. The LED ash on the camera was intended to invite
further queries from bystanders (RQ3.1). While participants reported that bystanders sometimes questioned the
ash (and if it meant that it was taking a photograph), none reported it triggering discomfort from bystanders.
However, a couple of female participants did report that their friends wanted to clarify that they were not staring
at their chests, but that the camera’s ashing LED had caught their attention. Therefore, it did create some
social diculty, but not in relation to the image capture per se. Three participants speculated that the camera
had intentionally been made big and red to draw attention, but said they would have preferred it was more
unobtrusive.
Unexpectedly, images where the LED ashed were slightly more likely to be shared with everyone (55.52%)
than images with no ash (51.17%, χ 2 = 4.24,d f = 1,p = 0.04). One possible explanation is that if bystanders
notice the camera ashing, then in the image they would be looking directly at the camera, making it a more
interesting image and thus worth sharing; conversely, covert images where the bystander is unaware they are
being captured are less likely to be shared. However this dierence is not large and is only one factor involved in
sharing decisions.
In an exceptional case, one participant’s sign was not on her camera, and reported that people thought she was
wearing a heart monitor. This agrees with our previous anecdotal observations of lifelogging cameras in the UK
where bystanders assumed a lifelogging camera was a medical or disability assistance device and therefore did
not ask questions about it. This may also go some way towards explaining the lack of comment from strangers in
this study.
Despite these attempts to make sure bystanders inquired about the camera, there were so few reports that, in
answer to RQ3.1, we nd that the features added to draw attention to the camera had almost no eect except to
make participants more uncomfortable (although this could have an indirect eect on their privacy behaviour,
such as choosing not to wear the camera in some locations).
5 THREATS TO VALIDITY AND LIMITATIONS
We measured a relatively small population of undergraduates for a week which will not generalize to other
populations or long term use. We also did not measure actual image sharing, we only asked participants who
they would hypothetically share with and actual behaviour may dier. The knowledge that images will not be
shared beyond the researchers is a genuine threat to the validity of the results, but is not one that we can ethically
foresee overcoming, except perhaps by recruiting actual lifeloggers (who would dier from a student sample in
numerous ways).
The volume of images captured would also likely aect the way that people treat them, as a matter of cognitive
load rather than privacy. Future studies could try asking participants to review fewer pictures, or over a shorter
time period, however this would not be typical of lifelogging practice.
The default wording of the questions on the daily image review - who they would not feel comfortable sharing
with - assumes that people can imagine their audiences correctly [1], and there may be dierent results if
participants were asked who they would feel comfortable sharing with.
Drawing from the interviews, we see suggestions that there may be other specic location sensitivities that we
did not capture in the coding, or that may require specialist knowledge. For example, one participant reported
being uncomfortable wearing the camera on the underground (subway train) when they went to London. Another
group said they wore the cameras to the student bar, but not a public one, because they felt that other students
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would be more understanding. This we could not distinguish in the coding, without veriable location information.
Use of GPS data would help here.
6 DISCUSSION
This paper presents an open source toolkit comprising the source code, hardware designs, questionnaires and
study guidelines needed to inexpensively replicate a study investigating privacy behaviours among groups of
visual lifeloggers. While much research in this area is dicult to replicate due to the use of proprietary or obsolete
hardware and software, this toolkit demonstrates how replicability in this domain can be upheld. Using the
toolkit, we conducted a eld study to identify which privacy management behaviours manifest in a UK campus
setting with groups of lifeloggers.
In common with previous work [20] we found that lifeloggers are willing to share most images and most
participants use the post-hoc image review to manage images rather than in-situ. In summary, what did seem to
exert an eect on sharing decisions was: bathroom (location), known vs unknown bystanders, the presence of
alcohol/cigarettes, and the camera ash.
The novel contributions of this paper include a ner level of analysis of bystander and location categories.
For location, that we did not nd location dierences (except for bathrooms) for sharing decisions is probably
because in private locations with other people present they are not likely to keep the camera on. Our qualitative
results showed emerging changes in social norms when groups of lifeloggers lived together. That the home could
become more private than an open space, due to everyone present wearing a lifelogging camera, is an interesting
example of the blurring of public and private contexts caused by technology [6].
As with [20] we found indications of people actively protecting the privacy of bystanders but unlike [20]
we had statistically signicant evidence for this. Moreover, we found that if a person captured in the image is
a stranger to the lifelogger, this makes the lifelogger less likely to share the image (RQ2.2). We also provided
evidence that this was not related to the recognisability of the image subject. We did not nd a quantitative
dierence in image sharing behaviour when images contained other lifeloggers as opposed to non-lifeloggers
(RQ2.1), but anecdotally some of the participants seemed to deem images of other lifeloggers as less private
overall, but referred to their pre-existing social group norms to guide their behaviour.
On the subject of bystander reaction (RQ3) we found fewer reactions than [20] even though our camera had
more features to draw attention to it (RQ3.1). This raises several suggestions to be explored in further research -
it may be a growing lack of concern for lifelogging in the general public, or that strangers did not know what
the device was, or that they did not feel comfortable inquiring about the camera. However, we did nd friends
of lifeloggers reacted much more than strangers and each lifelogger created social rules around lifelogging
among friends and fellow lifeloggers (RQ4). It is interesting that despite greater reports of reactions from known
than unknown bystanders, participants were more likely to share pictures of known bystanders. This means
that motivations to protect the privacy of people they know can be overridden by motivations to share with
their friends [46]. Further investigation into this topic could be undertaken by adding questions to the daily
photo review process about their relationships to the image subjects. Moreover, there may be a normalization
or adjustment period, whereby some people may be initially ambivalent about being photographed, but after
seeing the cameras for a while they consented. This would aect behaviour over time, and thus a time-sensitive
analysis might shed insight into changes in privacy behaviour over that adjustment period. It also became clear
from our study that the image content and the experience of capturing the image are not always going to have
the same privacy implications. In particular we note that discomfort with lifelogging is multi-faceted, e.g. one
group said they were more comfortable lifelogging in a group despite everyone looking at them, indicating that
people can be more comfortable breaking social norms as a group. This would also reect the non-normative
nature of lifelogging for this sample of UK students, whose experiences might dier from people involved in
quantied-self communities [11].
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We found some dierent results from Hoyle et al., in particular, participants in our study were not concerned
about sharing images of screens. There could be a number of reasons for this, including the types of activities
they are doing on the computer, or because our sample was mostly psychology students, whereas Hoyle et al.
had a majority of computer science students, who would be more technology and privacy aware.
6.1 Takeaway Messages and Suggestions for Future Work
Our overall observations support the ndings of [27] showing that context for privacy is multi-faceted and
governed by individual perceptions, but also that participants inferred in-group contextual norms around both
privacy and self-presentation concerns [37]. More work is required to determine how to code these indicators
in the image capture. We suggest that future lifelogging privacy research should adopt a model of privacy that
incorporates the tension between people’s need for interaction and sharing, with their need for privacy or desire
to protect the privacy of others[35][6][32] - to account for why people might share images or other data about
their friends and other lifeloggers in some contexts, yet delete or keep images private at other times.
Emerging privacy norms within groups should be examined in depth through further eld studies by using
our toolkit. A particular challenge is how to design the cameras in ways that enable bystanders (known and
unknown) to engage in meaningful conversations about their privacy preferences. In the long run, ndings of
all such studies are likely to facilitate the design and development of intelligent lifelogging cameras, which can
detect emerging privacy norms within groups and make recommendations to group members who have not yet
customized their privacy settings in line with the group norms.
The issue of bystander awareness of lifeloggers is clearly important; recent work on police use of body cameras
[3] suggests that awareness of lifelogging cameras changes the behaviour of the wearer and bystander. We
deliberately created a very visible design (bright red, ashing LED) to draw attention to the device but more work
is needed to understand how to satisfy both design aesthetics for the wearer and the need to make others aware
a camera is present.
Further development of the image reviewing software could also address some of the study limitations and
expand our understanding of lifelogging and privacy - for instance, by detecting long timespans between images
(where the camera would have been switched o), so participants could have been asked about those times
during the end of day review, or doing a ’walk-through’ design study where images are reviewed and discussed
with the interviewer at the same time, so decisions can be queried and followed up.
While we were able to conrm many of the ndings of previous work there were a number of dierences.
More work is required to unpick these issues and help gather more data to design privacy interfaces that are
relevant for both group and single person lifelogging. Our open source hardware and software for conducting
visual lifelogging studies should facilitate this future work.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We thank the undergraduate students at the University of Exeter who volunteered their time to wear the cameras
and review the many images recorded. The authors acknowledge partial support from EPSRC grants EP/K033433/1,
EP/K033522/1 (Privacy Dynamics), EPSRC grant EP/L021285/1 (Monetize Me) as well as the ERC Advanced Grant
- Adaptive Security and Privacy (291652 - ASAP), and SFI grant 3/RC/2094.
REFERENCES
[1] Alessandro Acquisti and Ralph Gross. 2006. Imagined communities: Awareness, information sharing, and privacy on the Facebook. In
International workshop on privacy enhancing technologies. Springer, 36–58. http://link.springer.com/10.1007/11957454_3
[2] Irwin Altman. 1975. The environment and social behavior : privacy, personal space, territory, crowding. Brooks/Cole Pub. Co., Monterey,
Calif.
Proceedings of the ACM on Interactive, Mobile, Wearable and Ubiquitous Technologies, Vol. 1, No. 2, Article 22. Publication date: June 2017.
Logging you, Logging me: A Study of Privacy and Sharing Behaviour in Groups of Visual Lifeloggers • 22:17
[3] Barak Ariel, Alex Sutherland, Darren Henstock, Josh Young, Paul Drover, Jayne Sykes, Simon Megicks, and Ryan Henderson. 2016.
“Contagious Accountability” A Global Multisite Randomized Controlled Trial on the Eect of Police Body-Worn Cameras on CitizensâĂŹ
Complaints Against the Police. Criminal Justice and Behavior (2016), 0093854816668218. http://cjb.sagepub.com/content/early/2016/09/
21/0093854816668218.abstract
[4] Richard A Armstrong. 2014. When to use the Bonferroni correction. Ophthalmic and Physiological Optics 34, 5 (2014), 502–508.
[5] Lemi Baruh and Zeynep Cemalcilar. 2014. It is more than personal: Development and validation of a multidimensional privacy orientation
scale. Personality and Individual Dierences 70 (Nov. 2014), 165–170. DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2014.06.042
[6] danah boyd. 2010. Social Network Sites as Networked Publics: Aordances, Dynamics, and Implications. In Networked Self: Identity, Com-
munity, and Culture on Social Network Sites, Zizi Papacharissi (Ed.). 39–58. http://www.danah.org/papers/2010/SNSasNetworkedPublics
[7] Kelly Erinn Caine. 2009. Exploring everyday privacy behaviors and misclosures. PhD. Georgia Institute of Technology. https://smartech.
gatech.edu/handle/1853/31665
[8] Jennifer L. Carlson, Mike Paget, and Tim McCollum. 2013. Replicating Two TelePresence Camera Depth-of-Field Settings in One User
Experience Study. (2013). http://ceur-ws.org/Vol-976/spaper6.pdf
[9] Soumyadeb Chowdhury, Md Sadek Ferdous, and Joemon M. Jose. 2016. Lifelogging User Study: Bystander Privacy. In Proceedings of
British HCI - Fusion. BCS, pp. 2.
[10] Soumyadeb Chowdhury, Md Sadek Ferdous, and Joemon M. Jose. 2016. Understanding Lifelog Sharing Preferences of Lifeloggers. In
Proceedings of the 28th Australian Conference on Computer-Human Interaction (OzCHI ’16). ACM, New York, NY, USA, 649–651. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3010915.3011852
[11] Sarah Clinch, Nigel Davies, Mateusz Mikusz, Paul Metzger, Marc Langheinrich, Albrecht Schmidt, and Geo Ward. 2016. Collecting
Shared Experiences through Lifelogging: Lessons Learned. Pervasive Computing, IEEE 15, 1 (2016), 58–67. http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/
xpls/abs_all.jsp?arnumber=7389256
[12] Alex Fitzpatrick. 2014. Why Google Glass Isn’t the Future. TIME.com (Nov. 2014). http://time.com/3588143/google-glass/
[13] Ruth Gavison. 1980. Privacy and the Limits of Law. The Yale Law Journal 89, 3 (Jan. 1980), 421. DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/795891
[14] Erving Goman. 1959. The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. Doubleday, New York.
[15] Cathal Gurrin, Rami Albatal, Hideo Joho, and Kaori Ishii. 2014. A privacy by design approach to lifelogging. Digital Enlightenment
Yearbook (2014), 49–73.
[16] Andrew F Hayes and Klaus Krippendor. 2007. Answering the call for a standard reliability measure for coding data. Communication
methods and measures 1, 1 (2007), 77–89.
[17] S. Hodges, L. Williams, E. Berry, S. Izadi, J. Srinivasan, A. Butler, G. Smyth, N. Kapur, and K. Wood. 2006. SenseCam: A retrospective
memory aid. UbiComp 2006: Ubiquitous Computing (2006), 177–193.
[18] David Houghton, Adam Joinson, Nigel Caldwell, and Ben Marder. 2013. Tagger’s delight? Disclosure and liking in Facebook: the eects of
sharing photographs amongst multiple known social circles. Technical Report. http://epapers.bham.ac.uk/1723
[19] Roberto Hoyle, Robert Templeman, Denise Anthony, David Crandall, and Apu Kapadia. 2015. Sensitive Lifelogs: A Privacy Analysis of
Photos from Wearable Cameras. In Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems. ACM Press, 1645–1648.
DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2702123.2702183
[20] Roberto Hoyle, Robert Templeman, Steven Armes, Denise Anthony, David Crandall, and Apu Kapadia. 2014. Privacy behaviors of
lifeloggers using wearable cameras. Proceedings of the 16th International Conference on Ubiquitous Computing (2014), 571–582. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2632048.2632079
[21] Carlos Jensen, Colin Potts, and Christian Jensen. 2005. Privacy Practices of Internet Users: Self-reports Versus Observed Behavior. Int. J.
Hum.-Comput. Stud. 63, 1-2 (July 2005), 203–227. DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijhcs.2005.04.019
[22] Paul Kelly, Simon J. Marshall, Hannah Badland, Jacqueline Kerr, Melody Oliver, Aiden R. Doherty, and Charlie Foster. 2013. An Ethical
Framework for Automated, Wearable Cameras in Health Behavior Research. American Journal of Preventive Medicine 44, 3 (March 2013),
314–319. DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.amepre.2012.11.006
[23] Marion Koelle, Matthias Kranz, and Andreas MÃűller. 2015. Don’t look at me that way!: Understanding User Attitudes Towards Data
Glasses Usage. In Proceedings of the 17th International Conference on Human-Computer Interaction with Mobile Devices and Services. ACM
Press, 362–372. DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2785830.2785842
[24] Mohammed Korayem, Robert Templeman, Dennis Chen, David Crandall, and Apu Kapadia. 2014. Screenavoider: Protecting computer
screens from ubiquitous cameras. arXiv preprint arXiv:1412.0008 (2014). http://arxiv.org/abs/1412.0008
[25] David Kushner. 2011. The Making of Arduino. IEEE Spectrum (26 Oct. 2011). http://spectrum.ieee.org/geek-life/hands-on/
the-making-of-arduino
[26] Carine Lallemand, Vincent Koenig, and Guillaume Gronier. 2013. Replicating an international survey on user experience: challenges,
successes and limitations. In Proceedings of RepliCHI - CHI ’13 Extended Abstracts on Human Factors in Computing Systems (CHI EA ’13).
5.
[27] Clara Mancini, K. Thomas, Y. Rogers, Blaine A. Price, L. Jedrzejczyk, A. K Bandara, A. N Joinson, and B. Nuseibeh. 2009. From spaces to
places: emerging contexts in mobile privacy. In Proc. of UbiComp2009. 1–10.
Proceedings of the ACM on Interactive, Mobile, Wearable and Ubiquitous Technologies, Vol. 1, No. 2, Article 22. Publication date: June 2017.
22:18 • B. A. Price et al.
[28] Steve Mann. 1998. ‘WearCam’ (The Wearable Camera): Personal Imaging Systems for long–term use in wearable tetherless computer–
mediated reality and personal Photo/Videographic Memory Prosthesis. In Proceedings of the 2nd IEEE International Symposium on
Wearable Computers. IEEE Computer Society, 124.
[29] Gary T. Marx. 2003. A Tack in the Shoe: Neutralizing and Resisting the New Surveillance. Journal of Social Issues 59, 2 (June 2003),
369–390. DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1540-4560.00069
[30] Miguel A. Nacenta, Yemliha Kamber, Yizhou Qiang, and Per Ola Kristensson. 2013. Memorability of Pre-designed and User-dened
Gesture Sets. In Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems (CHI ’13). ACM, New York, NY, USA,
1099–1108. DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2470654.2466142
[31] Narrative. 2017. Narrative Clip. (2017). http://getnarrative.com
[32] Helen Nissenbaum. 2010. Privacy in Context: Technology, Policy and the Integrity of Social Life. Standford University Press, Standford,
California.
[33] Patricia A. Norberg and Daniel R. Horne. 2007. Privacy attitudes and privacy-related behavior. Psychology and Marketing 24, 10 (2007),
829–847. DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/mar.20186
[34] Open Science Collaboration. 2015. Estimating the reproducibility of psychological science. Science 349, 6251 (Aug. 2015), aac4716–aac4716.
DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.aac4716
[35] Sandra S. Petronio. 2002. Boundaries of privacy: dialectics of disclosure. State University of New York Press.
[36] Rebecca S. Portno, Linda N. Lee, Serge Egelman, Pratyush Mishra, Derek Leung, and David Wagner. 2015. Somebody’s Watching
Me?: Assessing the Eectiveness of Webcam Indicator Lights. In Proceedings of the 33rd Annual ACM Conference on Human Factors in
Computing Systems. ACM Press, 1649–1658. DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2702123.2702164
[37] S. D. Reicher, R. Spears, and T. Postmes. 1995. A Social Identity Model of Deindividuation Phenomena. European Review of Social
Psychology 6, 1 (Jan. 1995), 161–198. DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14792779443000049
[38] Luis Sanchez, José Antonio Galache, Veronica Gutierrez, Jose Manuel Hernandez, Jesús Bernat, Alex Gluhak, and Tomás Garcia. 2011.
Smartsantander: The meeting point between future internet research and experimentation and the smart cities. In Future Network &
Mobile Summit (FutureNetw), 2011. IEEE, 1–8.
[39] Inc. Snap. 2017. Snapchat Spectacles. (2017). https://www.spectacles.com/
[40] Flávio Souza, Diego de Las Casas, Vinícius Flores, SunBum Youn, Meeyoung Cha, Daniele Quercia, and Virgílio Almeida. 2015. Dawn of
the Sele Era: The Whos, Wheres, and Hows of Seles on Instagram. In Proceedings of the 2015 ACM on Conference on Online Social
Networks (COSN ’15). ACM, New York, NY, USA, 221–231. DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2817946.2817948
[41] Iuliu Vasilescu, Keith Kotay, Daniela Rus, Matthew Dunbabin, and Peter Corke. 2005. Data collection, storage, and retrieval with an
underwater sensor network. In Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Embedded networked sensor systems. ACM, 154–165.
[42] A.F. Westin. 1967. Privacy and Freedom. Atheneum. https://books.google.ae/books?id=ydMlnQEACAAJ
[43] Alan F. Westin. 2003. Social and Political Dimensions of Privacy. Journal of Social Issues 59, 2 (2003), 431–453. DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.
1111/1540-4560.00072
[44] Max L. Wilson, Ed H. Chi, Stuart Reeves, and David Coyle. 2014. RepliCHI: The Workshop II. In CHI ’14 Extended Abstracts on Human
Factors in Computing Systems (CHI EA ’14). ACM, New York, NY, USA, 33–36. DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2559206.2559233
[45] Max L. L. Wilson, Paul Resnick, David Coyle, and Ed H. Chi. 2013. RepliCHI: The Workshop. In CHI ’13 Extended Abstracts on Human
Factors in Computing Systems (CHI EA ’13). ACM, New York, NY, USA, 3159–3162. DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2468356.2479636
[46] Mu Yang, Yijun Yu, Arosha K. Bandara, and Bashar Nuseibeh. 2014. Adaptive sharing for online social networks: a trade-o be-
tween privacy risk and social benet. In Proceedings of 13th International Conference on Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing and
Communications (TrustCom). IEEE, 45–52.
Received February 2017; revised April 2017; accepted April 2017
Proceedings of the ACM on Interactive, Mobile, Wearable and Ubiquitous Technologies, Vol. 1, No. 2, Article 22. Publication date: June 2017.
